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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves an action by Respondent T3 Enterprises, Inc. (“T3”) brought against
Appellant Safeguard Business Systems, Inc. (“SBS”) for breach of contract, tortious interference,
conversion, deceptive trade practices, and accounting, which was required to be arbitrated
pursuant to the parties’ contract. On appeal, SBS challenges an irrational and excessive $4.3
million arbitration award that resulted from: (i) legal errors by the District Court regarding
jurisdiction, forum selection, and attorney-client privilege, and (ii) the arbitrators exceeding their
powers under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (the “FAA”).
SBS is a Dallas-based company engaged in selling products to small businesses through a
nationwide network of distributors. T3 is a distributor in Idaho that was required to arbitrate any
disputes with SBS through a Dallas-administered arbitration under Texas substantive law. Due to
an erroneous jurisdictional ruling by the District Court, however, T3’s claims were instead
ordered to be arbitrated in Boise before three attorney-arbitrators who had no prior experience
with Texas law. That improperly-formed panel proceeded to disregard—and at times outright
flout—Texas law to award $1.475 million in damages (plus $2.886 million in doubled attorneys’
fees and expenses), relying largely on attorney-client privileged information the District Court
had incorrectly ordered SBS to previously disclose. In addition, the award inconsistently
provides future damages for 8-12 years as if the contract continued in force while declaring the
contract “constructively terminated” under non-Texas law to award T3 the entire value of its
business in a duplicative way. The resulting $4.3 million award thus far exceeds the contractual
limit of “actual damages for commercial loss,” particularly considering that T3’s business grew
5-9% each year after the alleged breaches. [See R. 19632.] Such an inexplicable result reflects a
panel that exceeded its power, committed manifest disregard of Texas law, and acted irrationally.
This Court, exercising its de novo review, should vacate the award in full.
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COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On August 26, 2014, T3 filed suit in Ada County district court alleging claims against
SBS and others for breach of contract, tortious interference, conversion, deceptive trade
practices, and accounting (the “District Court Action”). [R. 56.] In an amended complaint, a
separate Safeguard distributor in Idaho—Thurston Enterprises, Inc. (“Thurston”)—joined the
District Court Action with its own claims against SBS and other defendants. [R. 273.]1
On October 21, 2014, SBS answered and moved to enforce an arbitration clause in T3’s
contract requiring the claims against SBS to be arbitrated in Dallas through a proceeding
administered by the American Arbitration Association’s (“AAA”) Dallas office. [R. 755-770,
7718-19 (¶ 21(B)).] T3 opposed on the basis that the Dallas proceeding it agreed to was
unconscionable and against Idaho public policy. [R. 771-89.] After briefing, the District Court
incorrectly determined it had jurisdiction to consider T3’s objections and further erred by
holding that Texas law would invalidate a Dallas forum, ultimately ordering the arbitration to
occur in Idaho instead. [R. 987-88, 994.] As a result, in early 2015, T3 initiated an arbitration
styled as T3 Enterprises, Inc. v. Safeguard Business Systems, Inc., AAA No. 01-15-0002-6860,
with the AAA’s Denver office (the regional office for Idaho) as administered by Lance Tanaka
(the “Arbitration”). [R. 7576, 7606, 7661.] Mr. Tanaka then formed a tribunal of three attorneyarbitrators—Maureen Beyers of Arizona, the Honorable Kenneth Kato (Ret.) of Washington, and
Van Elmore of Colorado (the “Panel”) [see R. 7576]—who, as reflected in their resumes, had no
previous experience with Texas law. [See R. 13822-29.]
Thereafter, the parties agreed that discovery in the District Court Action (as determined
under ordinary standards of Idaho law) could be used in the Arbitration. [R. 7597-98.]

1

SBS separately appeals a trial judgment in favor of Thurston (see Docket No. 45092-2017).
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Accordingly, on March 24, 2016, the District Court issued an order that impacted both the court
and arbitration proceeding by rejecting SBS’s attorney-client privilege for thirty-five (35)
internal communications between its General Counsel and employees/agents. [R. 2219-27.] As
reflected in Issue 2 below, the Panel heavily relied on those documents in issuing its award.
On July 22, 2016, pre-hearing briefs were submitted in the Arbitration [R. 7814-39,
7842-71] and then evidentiary hearings were held in Boise in August 2016. [R. 8110 at 1:23-25.]
At the conclusion of the hearings, the Panel requested limited additional briefing from the parties
and proposed findings of fact/conclusions of law, which were simultaneously submitted by both
parties on September 16, 2016. [R. 7949-70, 7972-8022, 8024-40, 8042-8108.]
Shortly thereafter, on October 5, 2016, the Panel issued an “Interim Award” finding SBS
liable for breach of contract, tortious interference, and deceptive trade practices [R. 8143 at
34:12-14], and awarded the same damages for each theory allocated as follows: (i) $321,657.77
in past lost commissions; (ii) $373,473.76 in speculative future lost commissions for 8-12 years;
(iii) $212,432.39 in so-called “preferential pricing” damages; and (iv) $566,143.61 for the entire
value of T3’s distributorship based on a “constructive termination” theory under New Jersey and
Connecticut statutes. [R. 8135 (¶ 101), 8138 (¶¶ 112, 133).] After the Interim Award was issued,
SBS immediately raised a question to the Panel regarding how such a constructive termination
ruling would impact T3’s post-termination contractual obligations (including a non-compete and
requirement to return SBS’s intellectual property and confidential information). [See R. 8148.] In
response, T3 asserted it was electing to be fully discharged from the contract and would return
only certain intellectual property. [See R. 8146-47.] On October 17, 2016, the Panel accepted
T3’s election in full and issued a “Supplement to Interim Award” [R. 8150-52] that required the
return of intellectual property as agreed by T3, but otherwise “excused” T3 from having to
comply with any of its post-termination obligations. [R. 8151-52 (¶¶ 136-138).] In particular, the
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Panel improperly awarded T3 the customer lists and confidential information that, as plainly
stated in the contract [see R. 7715 (¶ 13)], belongs to SBS. [See R. 8152 at 3:2-4].
On November 28, 2016, the Panel issued a (“Fee Order”) that granted an additional
$2,449,208.14 in attorneys’ fees (after a 2.0x doubling of the “actual” incurred amount) and
$437,126.28 in litigation expenses that are not recognized by Texas law. [R. 8263 at 7:4-12.]
On December 5, 2016, the Panel consolidated all its previous rulings into a Final Award
of $4,362,041.95 (the “Arbitration Award”) [R. 8266-67], which T3 immediately sought to
confirm in the District Court Action while shortening the time to brief a motion to vacate based
on a contention that the Arbitration Award would have res judicata effect in the ongoing trial of
T3’s separate claims for tortious interference against SBS’s indirect parent company, the Deluxe
Corporation (“Deluxe”). [See R. 45.] SBS’s motion to vacate the award was thus filed on
December 9, 2016, [R. 7662-8307] with opposition and reply briefs filed on December 12th and
19th, respectively. [R. 9059-75.] The District Court later stated it would withhold any ruling until
after trial (where T3 failed to prove its tort claims against Deluxe [see R. 9135]). The parties thus
agreed to an oral hearing on the motion to vacate/modify that occurred on February 21, 2017.
On March 29, 2017, the District Court denied SBS’s motion to vacate and confirmed the
Arbitration Award in full [R. 12739-53], then issued a final judgment confirming T3’s award on
May 5, 2017. [R. 12934-37.] SBS filed a notice of appeal on May 5, 2017 as well (which was
last amended on August 16, 2017). [See R. 12938-97, 13630-13829.]
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STATEMENT OF FACTS2
T3 is an Idaho corporation principally owned by Dawn Teply that entered into a
distribution contract with SBS dated July 28, 2006 (the “Distributor Agreement”). [R. 7703,
7720.] The contract had an initial five-year term that was never renewed and thus, after 2011,
expressly existed on a “month-to-month” basis. [R. 7711 (¶ 10(F)).] Indeed, as acknowledged by
T3 in the arbitration hearings, the contract was terminable at will by either party. [R. 7877-78 at
1261:18-1262:2.] Under the Distributor Agreement, T3 is entitled to a commission of 30-35% on
completed sales for the order of products it successfully solicits from customers and also receives
a benefit of “account protection.” [See R. 8112-13 (¶ 5).] Account protection gives a distributor
the exclusive right to “commissions” generated on the sale of defined products to customers
whom the distributor is first to establish a relationship with and maintain as active accounts. [See
R. 8114 (¶ 4).] The right originated in the 1970’s when there was only one billing point for each
small business customer and one category of traditional paper products (i.e., checks and forms)
sold, without being updated through the years to address any technological changes or product
growth in the industry. [See R. 5461-66 (arbitration testimony).]
The Distributor Agreement further contains key provisions concerning arbitration, choice
of law, and limitations on remedies, the most relevant of which include:


Paragraph 21(B):

… ALL CONTROVERSIES, DISPUTES OR CLAIMS … ARISING OUT OF
… (2) THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE PARTIES HERETO; (3) THE
VALIDITY OF THIS AGREEMENT OR ANY RELATED AGREEMENT, OR
ANY PROVISION THEREOF … SHALL BE SUBMITTED FOR
ARBITRATION TO BE ADMINISTERED BY THE DALLAS, TEXAS OFFICE
2

These “facts” are derived largely from the Panel’s Interim Award. SBS cites them solely for
purposes of this appeal (and due to the limited review under the FAA) while reserving all rights
to deny and disprove the Panel’s inaccurate fact findings in any remand or other proceedings.
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OF THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION ON DEMAND OF
EITHER PARTY. SUCH ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE
CONDUCTED IN DALLAS, TEXAS …. [R. 7718-19 (emphasis added).]


Paragraph 18:

… All matters relating to arbitration will be governed by the Federal Arbitration
Act (9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.). … [T]his Agreement, the distributorship and the
relationship between you and Safeguard will be governed and construed under
and in accordance with the laws of Texas …. [R. 7717 (emphasis added).]


Paragraph 17(C):

THE DAMAGES RECOVERABLE BY EITHER PARTY HERETO FOR ANY
CONTROVERSY OR CLAIM … SHALL BE LIMITED TO ACTUAL DAMAGES
FOR COMMERCIAL LOSS. NEITHER PARTY HERETO SHALL BE LIABLE
TO THE OTHER FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES …. [R. 7717 (emphasis added).]
In 2013, Safeguard Acquisitions, Inc. (“SAI”)—an affiliate of SBS—purchased Form
Systems Inc. d/b/a DocuSource (“DocuSource”) and Idaho Business Forms (“IBF”), two larger
independent distributors in the Pacific Northwest. [R. 8119 (¶ 17), 8121 (¶ 23).] Prior to the
acquisitions, DocuSource and IBF were well-established multi-million dollar businesses that sold
products, in part, within some of the same geographic areas of Idaho as T3. [See R. 8119-20
(¶ 18).] Afterwards, the acquired companies continued selling the same products to their same
historical accounts, only doing so as SBS-affiliated outlets. [R. 8121 (¶ 26).] Some of those
sales, however, were to the same general organizations to which T3 was also selling low-volume
amounts of traditional paper products (i.e., checks, envelopes, forms), but largely involved
complex unique customized products/services provided to different billing contacts within the
larger customer organizations. [See, e.g., R. 8127 (¶¶ 58-60).] In many cases, there were preexisting contracts between DocuSource/IBF and their larger customers that T3 could not become
a party to or properly service.
Once the acquisitions were completed in 2013, SBS’s General Counsel (Michael Dunlap)
attempted to negotiate with T3 regarding account protection rights related to DocuSource/IBF’s
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ongoing sales to overlapping organizations. [See R. 8122 (¶ 32).] Summarizing due to the limited
grounds for review of an arbitration award, the result of the negotiations were that T3 ended up
selling its account protection rights as to some customers back to SBS while not agreeing to do
so for others when it decided to file suit in August 2014. [See, e.g., R. 8134 (¶ 95).] Notably,
there was no evidence in the Arbitration that T3 suffered a loss at any time in regard to its own
historical commission levels as a result of the acquisitions. To the contrary, T3’s own profits
indisputably grew after the acquisitions. In 2010, its commissions were $168,786.53 and
increased each year thereafter as follows: $171,786.53 (+1.78%) in 2011; $181,300.37 (+5.54%)
in 2012; $191,059.10 (+5.38%) in 2013; $199,458.03 (+4.40%) in 2014; and $219,354 (+9.98%)
in 2015. [R. 8128-29 (¶ 68).] Further, T3 remained a distributor during the Arbitration hearings
in August 2016 (as it does to this day) and, again, its commissions had increased by that point to
more than $220,000 for the year of 2016. [R. 8129 (¶ 68).] As such, what T3 sought to recover
by its claims was not any actual loss to its own historical business, but the gross profits (not
“commissions”) on sales by DocuSource/IBF, regardless of whether those unique product or
service sales were for business T3 never offered or was able to service, or were provided to
completely different areas of the greater customer organizations at issue under different existing
contracts and to different billing contacts.
As set out in the Course of Proceedings, the Panel ultimately awarded $4.3 million to T3
not only for the alleged actual loss (i.e., the gross profit on sales by DocuSource/IBF) but also
the entire alleged current market value of T3’s business, plus speculative future losses for “8 to
12 years,” and doubled attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses in total disregard of Texas law.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the District Court’s decision to strike the Dallas arbitration process was

an error that requires vacating the award in full.
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2.

Whether the District Court’s overruling of SBS’s claim of attorney-client

privilege was an error that requires vacating the award in full.
3.

Whether the District Court erred in denying SBS’s motion to vacate the award

based on the Arbitration Panel exceeding its powers under FAA § 10(a)(4).
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue 1 raises issues of jurisdiction and arbitrability, which are questions of law over
which this Court exercises free review. See Wattenbarger v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150
Idaho 308, 315, 246 P.3d 961, 968 (2010); see also H.F.L.P., LLC v. City of Twin Falls, 157
Idaho 672, 678, 339 P.3d 557, 563 (2014). Subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time,
including on appeal, and cannot be waived. See Johnson v. Blaine Cty., 146 Idaho 916, 924, 204
P.3d 1127, 1135 (2009); Troupis v. Summer, 148 Idaho 77, 79, 218 P.3d 1138, 1140 (2009).
Rulings on discovery matters—such as attorney-client privilege for Issue 2—are subject
to a trial court’s sound discretion. See Vaught v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 131 Idaho 357, 360, 956
P.2d 674, 677 (1998). To determine if there was an abuse of discretion, this Court considers
whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with legal standards; and (3) reached its
decision by an exercise of reason. See Perry v. Magic Valley Reg’l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 51,
995 P.2d 816, 821 (2000). Evidentiary matters are further subject to the requirement that an error
must have affected a party’s substantial right. Id.
Review of the Arbitration Award for purposes of Issue 3 is governed by the FAA, which
applies to all arbitrations affecting interstate commerce or, pursuant to the parties’ choice of
Texas law, by their agreement that the FAA would govern arbitration. See Hecla Mining Co. v.
Bunker Hill Co., 101 Idaho 557, 561, 617 P.2d 861, 865 (1980) (when interstate commerce is
involved, this Court “utilize[s] the [FAA] and the cases thereunder instead of Idaho’s enactment
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of the Uniform Arbitration Act.”); In re Kellogg Brown & Root, 80 S.W.3d 611, 617 (Tex. App.
2002) (“We hold that when, as here, the parties agree to arbitrate under the FAA, they are not
required to establish that the transaction at issue involves or affects interstate commerce.”). The
grounds for vacating an award under the FAA include when “the arbitrators exceeded their
powers,” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4), which is interpreted by federal courts to occur when:


Arbitrators disregard the parties’ choice of law, see Coutee v. Barington
Capital Grp., L.P., 336 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Arbitrators act
beyond their authority if they fail to adhere to a valid, enforceable choice of
law clause agreed upon by the parties.”);



Arbitrators exhibit a “manifest disregard”3 of the controlling law, see Comedy
Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009),
including by disregard of undisputed facts, see Coutee, 336 F.3d at 1133
(courts cannot “confirm an arbitration award that is legally irreconcilable with
the undisputed facts” and, “because facts and law are often intertwined, an
arbitrator’s failure to recognize undisputed, legally dispositive facts may
properly be deemed a manifest disregard for the law”);



The award violates an express limitation in the parties’ contract, see Mich.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 826, 830 (9th Cir. 1995); 21st
Century Fin. Servs., LLC v. Manchester Fin. Bank, 747 F.3d 331, 336 (5th
Cir. 2014) (“Where arbitrators act contrary to express contractual provisions,
they have exceeded their powers.”);



The award contains an inconsistency that renders it “completely irrational,”
see Comedy Club, Inc., 553 F.3d at 1288 (9th Cir. 2009); or

3

After the U.S. Supreme Court’s Hall Street decision in 2008, some federal appellate circuits
questioned whether “manifest disregard” remains valid. The Ninth Circuit and a majority of
others hold it is still valid because, in essence, manifest disregard was always interpreted as one
way an arbitrator exceeds their power under FAA § 10(a)(4). See, e.g., Comedy Club, 553 F.3d at
1289-90. A minority of federal circuits no longer use the phrase as a “term of art” because they
had interpreted manifest disregard to be a “nonstatutory” ground. See, e.g., Citigroup Glob.
Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 358 (5th Cir. 2009). For this appeal, SBS relies upon the
statutory-based standards of manifest disregard approved by the majority of federal circuits.
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The award grants relief that offends public policy, see Aramark Facility Servs.
v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 530 F.3d 817, 823 (9th Cir. 2008) (“However, one
narrow exception to this generally deferential review is the now-settled rule
that a court need not, in fact cannot, enforce an award which violates public
policy.”).

An appellate court’s review of an arbitration award under the FAA is de novo in all regards. See
Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 2007).
COSTS AND ATTORNEYS’ FEES ON APPEAL
Pursuant to I.A.R. 40, SBS requests an award of its costs on appeal. SBS does not seek an
award of attorneys’ fees on appeal because neither the FAA nor Texas law allows fees to be
recovered for post-arbitration proceedings. [See, e.g., R. 12903-05 (district court rejecting T3’s
request for attorneys’ fees on same basis and citing authority).]
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT’S DECISION TO STRIKE THE DALLAS ARBITRATION PROCESS
WAS AN ERROR THAT REQUIRES VACATING THE AWARD IN FULL.
The Distribution Agreement between T3 and SBS mandates that any dispute be arbitrated

in Dallas, Texas, in a proceeding administered by the Dallas office of the AAA. [R. 7718-19
(¶ 21(B)).] Texas law was chosen to govern all substantive state law matters with the FAA
governing all arbitration matters. [R. 7717.] Accordingly, shortly after T3 filed suit, SBS moved
to compel arbitration under the FAA. T3 responded by arguing the Dallas forum was
unconscionable and against Idaho public policy and, ultimately, that the entire arbitration
agreement was unenforceable. [See R. 773-82, 963-67.] The District Court denied T3’s request
to annul the entire arbitration clause, but struck the Dallas forum. [See R. 986-89, 994.]
The District Court’s ruling was erroneous for two reasons: (i) the District Court did not
have jurisdiction to address T3’s objection to forum and (ii) there is no support for the legal
conclusion that a Texas court would invalidate a Dallas forum on the basis of Idaho law when
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the parties agreed Texas law would govern the contract. The District Court’s error substantially
prejudiced SBS by eliminating the arbitration process agreed to by the parties in their contract
(i.e., administration by the Dallas office of the AAA in Dallas), and must be vacated in full.
A.

The District Court Did Not Have Jurisdiction to Rule on the Forum,
Rendering the Entire Arbitration Proceeding in Idaho Invalid.

After SBS’s motion to compel arbitration was filed in 2014, the District Court
appropriately questioned, sua sponte, if it had jurisdiction to consider T3’s argument that the
Dallas forum was unconscionable or against public policy [see R. 978], but then incorrectly
answered that question. In its order of December 17, 2014, the District Court first noted
(properly) that FAA § 2 provides an arbitration agreement is enforceable unless subject to being
revoked under a “generally applicable contract defense” [R. 980], and acknowledged substantial
federal case law providing that procedural matters such as forum are for an arbitrator to decide.
[R. 981 (citing cases).] However, the District Court distinguished that federal law on the grounds
that none involved a challenge to forum by way of a generally applicable contract defense
[R. 983], ultimately concluding: “where a forum selection clause is challenged pursuant to a
contract defense, the issue becomes a substantive one for the court to decide rather than a matter
of procedure for the arbitrator,” and deeming T3’s challenge a substantive one because it
“place[d] the validity of the entire arbitration clause at issue.” [R. 983-84 (emphasis added).]
That ruling was incorrect because Section 21(B)(3) of the Distributor Agreement
provides that disputes concerning the “validity” of the agreement were themselves committed to
arbitration [see R. 7718 (¶ 21(B)) (“… (3) THE VALIDITY OF THIS AGREEMENT … OR
ANY PROVISION THEREOF … SHALL BE SUBMITTED FOR ARBITRATION” in
Dallas)], and T3 did not raise any general contract defense to that specific delegation provision.
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As such, the District Court had no jurisdiction to order the arbitration occur in Idaho. T3’s
objection to forum was supposed to be arbitrated in a proceeding administered from Dallas.
The conclusion that the District Court did not have jurisdiction is mandated by the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010). In Rent-ACenter, the plaintiff similarly challenged an agreement to arbitrate on the basis it was
unconscionable (under Nevada law) and the Ninth Circuit similarly decided, like the District
Court here, that when “a party challenges an arbitration agreement as unconscionable, and thus
asserts that he could not meaningfully assent to the agreement, the threshold question of
unconscionability is for the court.” Id. at 66-67. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, however,
because the contract contained a provision requiring disputes over the enforceability of the
agreement to themselves be arbitrated in the first instance. Id. at 72-75 (labeling such a clause a
“delegation provision”). Further, it mattered none that the delegation provision was part of a
larger arbitration agreement challenged in whole as unconscionable by the plaintiff, because:
Section 2 [of the FAA] operates on the specific “written provision” to “settle by
arbitration a controversy” that the party seeks to enforce. Accordingly, unless
Jackson challenged the delegation provision specifically, we must treat it as valid
under § 2, and must enforce it under §§ 3 and 4, leaving any challenge to the
validity of the [arbitration agreement] as a whole for the arbitrator.
Id. at 72 (emphasis added, clarification in brackets).4 The same is true here. The delegation
provision in Paragraph 21(B)(3) was not specifically challenged. [See R. 773-82.]. T3’s objection
to forum thus also had to be arbitrated in a proceeding administered by the AAA’s Dallas office.

4

See also Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., 840 F.3d 1016, 1032 (9th Cir. 2016); Parnell v. CashCall,
Inc., 804 F.3d 1142, 1148 (11th Cir. 2015) (language requiring arbitration of “any issue
concerning the validity, enforceability, or scope” of contract was delegation provision); Danley
v. Encore Capital Grp., Inc., 680 F. App’x 394, 397 (6th Cir. 2017) (same).
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Consequently, the District Court’s order to arbitrate in Idaho was invalid due to a lack of
jurisdiction. See Kantor v. Kantor, 160 Idaho 803, 808, 379 P.3d 1073, 1078 (2016) (“judgments
and orders made without subject matter jurisdiction are void”). The resulting Arbitration Award
is void and must be vacated in full. See, e.g., State v. Hartwig, 150 Idaho 326, 328, 246 P.3d 979,
981-83 (2011) (vacating civil order issued in criminal case when court did not have jurisdiction);
see also Lower Colo. River Auth. v. Papalote Creek II, LLC, 858 F.3d 916, 927 (5th Cir. 2017)
(vacating arbitration award when district court did not have jurisdiction).
B.

Alternatively, the District Court Erred as to Texas Law on Forum Selection
and Thereby Violated Section 5 of the FAA.

Even if the District Court had jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the Dallas forum
selection, it erred as a matter of law on the merits of that legal issue in a way that negated SBS’s
right to a Dallas-administered arbitration, which is a violation of FAA § 5 requiring vacatur.
In its December 17, 2014, order addressing the merits of the forum issue, the District
Court first correctly ruled the parties validly chose Texas law—not Idaho law—to govern their
dispute and that their choice of law must be enforced. [See R. 984-86 (citing I.C. § 28-1-301(a)).]
Nevertheless, after concluding Idaho law did not apply, the District Court then went on to rule
that a Texas court (applying Texas law) would invalidate the Dallas forum based on an Idaho
statute (I.C. § 29-110(1) (hereinafter, the “Arbitration in Idaho Only Statute” or “AIO Statute”)).
[See R. 986-89.] That conclusion of law was an error. To illustrate, it is useful to break the
District Court’s circular analysis into its four component parts, which were:
1.

I.C. § 28-1-301(a) requires enforcing the choice of Texas law. [R. 984-86.]

2.

Texas has adopted M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972)
(hereinafter, “The Bremen”) to assess forum selection clauses. [R. 987.]

3.

The Bremen states that, for a forum selection clause to be valid, it must not
contravene a strong public policy “either in the forum where the suit would
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be brought, or the forum from which the suit has been excluded.” [R. 987
(bolding added to reflect error in District Court’s quotation of law).]
4.

Texas law would apply The Bremen—as misquoted above—to rule the AIO
Statute (I.C. § 29-110(1)) invalidates a Dallas forum. [R. 987-89.]

As highlighted in bold above, the District Court made a conspicuous error in its quotation of law.
The Bremen does not consider the public policy of an “excluded” forum. See 407 U.S. at 15.
Rather, the “excluded” language incorrectly attributed to The Bremen by the District Court
comes solely from a Florida appellate court.5 As discussed further below, that inaccuracy led the
District Court to misapply Texas law on forum selection clauses (i.e., No. 4 above).
On a more basic level, however, the District Court erred in how it did not give proper
effect to Idaho’s choice of law statute, I.C. § 28-1-301(a). It appears the District Court was under
the unwarranted impression that the AIO Statute applies to every arbitration clause considered by
an Idaho court regardless of an express choice-of-law provision. Nothing in the Idaho Code
provides for such a broad application. Certainly a contract between two out-of-state parties
brought to an Idaho court for adjudication (due perhaps to general jurisdiction), would not result
in application of the AIO Statute to invalidate their agreement to arbitrate elsewhere. To the
contrary, it would be the substantive law that governs the contract which controls. See, e.g.,
Sizemore v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-00511-MHW, 2012 WL 13041446, at *4 (D.

5

The District Court’s misquote is derived from its reliance on Cerami-Kote, Inc. v. Energywave
Corp., 116 Idaho 56, 59, 773 P.2d 1143, 1146 (1989), a case involving Florida law, to make an
improper assumption about Texas law. Cerami-Kote cited a Florida appellate case that, for
unknown reason, added the “excluded” forum language to its citation of The Bremen. See
Maritime Ltd. P’ship v. Greenman Advert. Assocs., Inc., 455 So. 2d 1121, 1123 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984). But no “excluded” forum language exists in The Bremen or the Florida Supreme
Court case that Cerami-Kote actually relied upon. See Cerami-Kote, 116 Idaho at 59 (citing
Manrique v. Fabbri, 493 So. 2d 437, 438 (Fla. 1986)). More importantly, no Texas case has
expanded on The Bremen like the Florida appellate court did in Maritime. Texas law plainly does
not consider an “excluded” forum’s policies when assessing a forum selection clause.
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Idaho May 9, 2012) (finding AIO Statute inapplicable when parties selected Indiana law); see
also Fisk v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 141 Idaho 290, 108 P.3d 990 (2005) (rejecting AIO
Statute when federal maritime law governed).6 The same result should occur here due to the
parties’ choice of Texas law. When another state’s law is selected in compliance with I.C. § 281-301(a), then the rest of Idaho law no longer applies (and, further, subsection (b) of I.C. § 28-1301 lists statutes that survive the choice of law, but does not include the AIO Statute). As a
result, given the parties’ valid choice of Texas law—as the District Court ruled [see R. 984-86]
and T3 never disputed [see R. 774]—there was no basis for applying the AIO Statute.
The District Court accordingly erred in concluding Texas law would apply the AIO
Statute to invalidate a Dallas arbitration forum. As explained in footnote 5 above, the District
Court erred in relying on Florida law to make its legal conclusion. The Texas cases cited (but not
applied) by the District Court uniformly are guided by the public policy of Texas when analyzing
forum selection clauses. [See R. 987-88 (District Court’s order citing In re Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc.,
257 S.W.3d 228, 231-32 (Tex. 2008); In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 109, 111-13 (Tex. 2004)).]
And, in Texas, there is no policy limiting where parties can arbitrate. To the contrary, Texas law
has a very strong preference for enforcing forum selection clauses, even if it may otherwise
impair substantive rights. See, e.g., In re Lyon, 257 S.W.3d at 234 (holding inability to assert
usury claim in Pennsylvania did not create public policy basis to deny enforcement of forum
selection); Young v. Valt.X Holdings, Inc., 336 S.W.3d 258, 263-66 (Tex. App. 2010) (enforcing
forum selection clause claimed to contradict federal policy of anti-waiver of securities laws,

6

See also Oregon-Idaho Utils., Inc. v. Skitter Cable TV, Inc., No. 1:16-CV-00228-EJL, 2017
WL 3446290, at *7 (D. Idaho Aug. 10, 2017) (noting that, if the AIO Statute “was determinative,
striking down the forum selection clause would be routine rather than extraordinary, standing
Atlantic Marine on its head.”) (citations omitted).
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noting plaintiff was free to reject contract on front end if it desired such protections); see also
Univ. Comput. Consulting Holding, Inc. v. Hillcrest Ford Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., Nos. 14-0400819-CV, 14-04-01103-CV, 2005 WL 2149508, at *5 (Tex. App. Sept. 8, 2005) (rejecting The
Bremen challenge to uphold out-of-state arbitration forum).
Further, an even more stringent rule of enforcement applies when a party seeks to avoid
an arbitration forum it agreed to when the FAA governs. See, e.g., Northrop Grumman Ship Sys.,
Inc. v. Ministry of Def. of Republic of Venezuela, 575 F.3d 491, 503 (5th Cir. 2009) (arbitrationforum clauses “must be enforced, even if unreasonable” under The Bremen, given FAA’s
preemption of state law) (citations omitted).
As a result, even if the District Court had jurisdiction to rule on T3’s objections to forum,
the District Court erred as to its conclusions of Texas law. SBS and T3 specifically agreed, in
bold all-capital terms, that all disputes would be decided in a Dallas-administered AAA
arbitration in Dallas. [R. 7718 (¶ 21(B)).] The District Court negated that right by ordering the
arbitration to occur in Idaho. [See R. 994.] As a jurisdictional matter, the Arbitration Award must
be vacated because the entire Idaho proceeding was invalid. To the extent the District Court had
jurisdiction and only erred as to Texas law, the outcome nonetheless is the same under FAA § 5.
Section 5 of the FAA states that, “[i]f in the [arbitration] agreement provision be made
for a method of naming or appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, such method shall
be followed.” (emphasis added). A failure to strictly comply with the process required by a
contract requires any subsequently-issued award to be vacated. For example, in PoolRe Ins.
Corp. v. Org. Strategies, Inc., 783 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2015), the Fifth Circuit vacated an award
where the arbitrator was not selected by the B.W.I. Insurance Director of Anguilla as stated in
the parties’ contract, even though no such person actually existed. The Fifth Circuit found the
procedural defect nonetheless fatal, holding that “awards made by arbitrators not appointed
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under the method provided in the parties’ contract must be vacated.” Id. at 263 (emphasis added).
Several other federal circuits have held the same way for various procedural defects.7
The only basis not to vacate an award under FAA § 5 is due to a “trivial departure” or
when a party waives the process required by the contract. Neither is at issue here. Arbitration is a
matter that arises solely through the consent of the parties. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682 (2010) (reciting principle and precedent). As a result, the failure to
strictly follow the exact procedure stated in the parties’ contract is always a non-trivial violation.
A “trivial departure” occurs only in tangential ways outside the contract language itself, such as
when an arbitration organization selected by the parties fails to follow its internal procedures.
See, e.g., Bulko v. Morgan Stanley DW Inc., 450 F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 2006) (failure of NASD
to follow its own qualification standards trivial; distinguishing from cases where method for
selecting arbitrators stated in parties’ agreement). Further, a waiver of strict compliance with the
process stated in an arbitration agreement occurs only when an aggrieved party’s objection is not
preserved by either: (i) raising it to the arbitrators, or (ii) an adverse court ruling. See Brook v.
Peak Int’l, Ltd., 294 F.3d 668, 674 (5th Cir. 2002), opinion modified on reh’g (July 9, 2002).
Here, there was no “trivial departure” because the Distributor Agreement explicitly states
the arbitration was to be administered by the AAA’s Dallas office and occur in Dallas, but, as a
result of the District Court’s order, it was administered by the AAA’s Denver office (the regional
office for Idaho) [see R. 7576, 7606, 7661 (Lance Tanaka in Denver)] and occurred in Boise.
That failure alone requires vacating the Arbitration Award under FAA § 5. Nonetheless,
7

See, e.g., Cargill Rice, Inc. v. Empresea Nicaraguense Dealimentos Basicos, 25 F.3d 223, 226
(4th Cir. 1994) (vacating award when contract required arbitrators appointed by mutual
agreement and it was done without party input); Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Garage Emps.
Union, Local 272, 791 F.2d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 1986) (vacating award when arbitrator was appointed
pursuant to collective bargaining agreement as opposed to by AAA as required in contract).
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additional prejudice exists in that, if the process stated in the contract had been followed, then the
claims would have been submitted to the AAA’s Dallas office and there would have been a pool
of arbitrators experienced with Texas law from which to form a panel. Instead, the AAA’s
Denver office formed a tribunal of attorneys who had no prior experience with Texas law. [See
R. 13822-29 (arbitrator resumes).] The result, as discussed below in Issue 3, was a Panel that
manifestly disregarded the controlling Texas law and exceeded its powers to issue an irrational
$4.3 million award that violated several express contractual limitations and requirements.
Finally, there is no waiver because, again, the District Court affirmatively ordered the
arbitration to occur in Idaho. [See R. 994 (stating “T3 shall submit its claims against SBS for
arbitration in Idaho”).] SBS’s opposition was thus fully preserved for this appeal.
Accordingly, this Court should declare the Arbitration Award void due to the District
Court’s lack of jurisdiction. Nonetheless, even if the District Court had jurisdiction, this Court
should vacate the Arbitration Award because the District Court violated FAA § 5.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY OVERRULING SBS’S ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE,
WHICH REQUIRES VACATING THE AWARD IN FULL.
Several months prior to the August 2016 Arbitration hearings, the District Court

separately made an incorrect ruling on attorney-client privilege that forced SBS to disclose
privileged documents which, to its prejudice, were relied on by the Panel for its award. Under
well-established Idaho law and public policy, that error requires vacating the Arbitration Award.
This issue has two components: (i) whether the District Court committed legal error in its
order of March 24, 2016, as to attorney-client privilege [see R. 2219-28], and (ii) how that error
affected the Arbitration. The first component is exactly the same for SBS’s separate appeal of
Thurston’s trial judgment. [See R. 13636 (ninth bullet).] Further, given T3 and Thurston jointly
moved for this discovery matter to be determined by the District Court [see R. 1618-19], this
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Court’s review now is done under the ordinary standards of Idaho law as opposed to the very
limited FAA review. Accordingly, the initial argument in subsection A below is identical to that
in the contemporaneously-filed brief for Thurston’s appeal (see pp. 17-22 of that brief). The
briefs differ in that subsection B below addresses how the error affected T3’s Arbitration,
whereas the brief in Thurston’s appeal addresses the impact on the separate trial.
A.

As a Matter of Idaho Law, the District Court Erred in Overruling SBS’s
Assertion of Attorney-Client Privilege.

In the discovery phase of the District Court proceeding (months prior to the arbitration
hearings), T3 and Thurston jointly challenged SBS’s assertion of attorney-client privilege over a
few hundred emails that were redacted or withheld in full. In response, SBS’s trial counsel
conducted a second-level review of its privilege log and, for various reasons, withdrew privilege
as to all but forty-one (41) documents, which was about 90% of what was initially logged. [See
R. 1863-67, 10272 (¶ 31) (explaining reasons for de-designation).] That left in dispute internal
communications to or from Michael Dunlap, SBS’s General Counsel, involving his efforts to
resolve account protection with T3/Thurston. The District Court reviewed those 41 documents in
camera and rejected privilege for nearly all on the basis that they concerned “factual matters and
business advice about the cross-over customers made in Dunlap’s capacity as corporate secretary
rather than purely legal issues.” [R. 2226.] As demonstrated below, the District Court erred as to
the legal standard of attorney-client privilege and materially prejudiced SBS. Specifically,
Exhibits 157, 245, 266-70, 326-30, 336, 338, 352, 356-60, 362 (the “Privileged Documents”)
were ordered produced and used by T3/Thurston in both the trial and arbitration.
The standard of review is “abuse of discretion” with the additional requirement that any
error must have affected a substantial right. See Perry v. Magic Valley Reg’l Med. Ctr., 134
Idaho 46, 50-51, 995 P.2d 816, 820-21 (2000). In regard to attorney-client privilege specifically,
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the conclusion that a substantial right was impacted by improper disclosure is virtually
automatic. See, e.g., Frontier Refining, Inc. v. Gorman-Rupp Co., Inc., 136 F.3d 695, 706 (10th
Cir. 1998) (“There is too great a risk that a jury would accord significant or undue weight to the
testimony and admissions of a party’s own lawyers.”). Indeed, this Court has stated the
prejudicial effect of such an error “is obvious.” State v. Iwakiri, 106 Idaho 618, 621, 682 P.2d
571, 574 (1984) (ruling erroneous disclosure mandated reversal of criminal conviction).
The applicable legal standard for attorney-client privilege in Idaho is established by the
rule of evidence that provides a party with a right to not disclose “confidential communications
made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client.”
I.R.E. 502(b). The District Court identified that rule as controlling [R. 2220], but proceeded to
water it down in two ways—(i) by creating a presumption against in-house attorneys and (ii) by
construing the privilege to encompass only “purely legal matters”—then misapplied that
weakened standard to Dunlap’s internal communications about account protection matters.
First, there is no presumption against in-house attorneys. I.R.E. 502(b) does not
distinguish between inside or outside counsel and refers only to a “lawyer.” Yet, the District
Court unilaterally declared the standard “stricter” for an in-house counsel; so much so that it
would presume their communications are not for a legal purpose. [See R. 2221.] That was
incorrect. Nothing in I.R.E. 502 creates a presumption and the majority of courts nationwide
recognize a “lawyer’s status as in-house counsel does not dilute the privilege.” In re Kellogg
Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754, 758 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see also, e.g., United States v. Rowe, 96
F.3d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir. 1996) (“In determining the existence of a privilege, no attempt is made
to distinguish between inside and outside counsel.”). Indeed, this Court has not applied a
presumption against in-house attorneys in prior cases. See, e.g., Kirk v. Ford Motor Co., 141
Idaho 697, 704, 116 P.3d 27, 34 (2005) (applying privilege to in-house counsel without bias).
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Second, the District Court erred by construing the privilege to cover only “purely legal
matters” (and doing so inconsistently between the parties). [R. 2226.] I.R.E. 502(b) states it
applies to any communication made to “facilitate … legal services.” That is much broader than
the District Court allowed and, indeed, the entire reason for the privilege is to encourage “full
and frank communication” between lawyer and client, see Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383, 389 (1981), as also reflected in the comments of the Idaho State Bar Evidence Committee:
The rule is intended to provide the privilege to all communications between the
attorney and client, and to others necessary to the communication process or the
rendition of professional legal services ….
M. CLARK, REPORT OF

THE IDAHO

STATE BAR EVIDENCE COMMITTEE, C502, p.6 re Subsection

(b) (Dec. 16, 1983, Supp. 1985) (emphasis added). That goal necessarily requires discussing
facts and business matters related to legal services and, as such, courts routinely apply the
privilege to “counseling and planning” and “business decision-making” when an attorney is
involved due to his or her “knowledge and discretion in the law.” See United States v. Chen, 99
F.3d 1495, 1501-02 (9th Cir. 1996).8 Further, communications about negotiations a lawyer
engages in with a third party inherently entail the discussion of non-privileged facts, but the
lawyer-client communication nevertheless remains privileged. See Studiengesellschaft v.
Novamont, No. 77 Civ. 4722, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15042 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1980)
(ruling privilege applies to internal communications regarding attorney negotiations if dispute is
“essentially a legal one involving rights and duties under … [a] contract.”).9 Thus, contrary to the
8

See also Willnerd, 2010 WL 5391270 at *3 (“Open communication assists lawyers in rendering
legal advice, not only to represent their clients in ongoing litigation, but also to prevent litigation
by advising clients to conform their conduct to the law and by addressing legal concerns that
may inhibit clients from engaging in otherwise lawful and socially beneficial activities.”).
9

See id. at *5-6 (privilege applied because attorney-negotiator’s “purpose was to resolve an
essentially legal dispute, in circumstances marked by legal uncertainty. In those circumstances,
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District Court’s view, the communication of even purely non-legal matters is protected if the
overall purpose involves a legal service. I.R.E. 502(b); Willnerd v. Sybase, Inc., No. 1:09-cv500-BLW, 2010 WL 5391270 at *3 (D. Idaho Dec. 22, 2010) (the “communication[] of facts are
privileged even if the original facts are not”). Notably, the District Court recognized as much
when ruling T3/Thurston’s attorney agreements were not discoverable [see R. 2225 (noting
parties can be compelled to testify as to facts “but the communication [between lawyer and
client] itself remains privileged”)], yet applied a different standard for SBS’s privilege. It is hard
to reconcile the District Court’s about-face on that legal point as anything less than arbitrary.
Compared to the proper legal standard, it is clear the District Court abused its discretion
in ordering the Privileged Documents produced because they are all confidential internal
communications between lawyer and client representatives made in the overall context10 of a
legal service being provided by SBS’s General Counsel, Michael Dunlap [see R. 1875-76 (¶ 5)],
regardless of whether they encompassed factual or business matters. For example:


Exhibit 245 is an email between SBS’s lawyer, Dunlap, and SBS employees
specifically concerning his “account protection resolution work.” [See also
Ex. 269 (referring to “IBF account protection”), Ex. 157 (containing
statements from Dunlap about “honor[ing] account protection”).]



Exhibit 266 is an email between Dunlap and IBF’s post-acquisition manager,
Tressa McLaughlin—at a time when IBF was an affiliate of SBS—concerning

his actions were informed by his legal expertise. That his goal may have been to make the most
financially favorable deal possible for his client does not alter these facts.”); see also Boss Mfg.
Co. v. Hugo Boss AG, No. 97 CIV. 8495, 1999 WL 47324 SHS MHD, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1,
1999) (privilege applied to internal discussion of commercial matters because “fundamental
consideration animating the discussions and counsel’s involvement in those discussions was the
need to protect the legal interests of Hugo Boss”).
10

See In re Lidoderm Antitrust Litig., No. 14-md-02521-WHO, 2015 WL 7566741 at *3 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 25, 2015) (report by attorney of settlement negotiations protected when, “considered
as a whole and in context,” it was made in connection with a legal purpose).
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details of the accounts Dunlap was addressing with T3. [See also Ex. 269
(continuation of same); Ex. 352 (Dunlap giving input on same to client).]


Exhibit 327 is an email from Dunlap to SBS’s President, J.J. Sorrenti,
speaking of a “risk” in account protection interpretation he identified from his
past negotiations. [See also Ex. 267 (Dunlap noting he was “represent[ing] his
client”); Ex. 336 (Dunlap reporting thoughts to Sorrenti about negotiations
with T3), Ex. 330 (same); Exs. 358, 360 (Sorrenti requesting Dunlap’s review
of draft communication regarding account protection).]

Certainly a few of the Privileged Documents could be interpreted to contain unflattering
comments that T3/Thurston will no doubt seek to highlight [see, e.g., Ex. 357 (Sorrenti
expressing frustration with T3 negotiations, stating: “… She’s not impressing me [and] she
should be trying.”); Ex. 359 (Dunlap asserting “… she doesn’t have an or else”)], but they all
occurred within the context of efforts to resolve account protection and, thus, fall within the
realm of “full and frank” discussion. Indeed, T3 and Thurston have consistently stressed that
Dunlap’s efforts were nothing less than an attempt to address rights and duties under their
contracts [see Tr. Vol. I at 888:20-890:1] or to “avoid litigation” [see R. 4437 (Thurston Decl., ¶
14)], which directly resulted in the Privileged Documents. [See, e.g., Tr. Vol. II at 1282:2-15
(testimony regarding Exhibit 327), 1302:23-1304:21 (testimony regarding Exhibit 359).]
As a result, the District Court’s characterization of Dunlap as acting in a business role in
regard to the Privileged Documents, due to his secondary title of corporate secretary, was not an
“exercise of reason.” In-house attorneys often hold such a title, but only for record-keeping
purposes. See Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo! Inc., 132 A.3d 752, 790 n.38 (Del. Ch. 2016)
(discussing duties of corporate secretary). It was not rational for the District Court to conclude
that Dunlap’s negotiations with T3/Thurston about account protection, and subsequent internal
communications, were done as a corporate secretary rather than a lawyer. Providing a legal
service was Dunlap’s primary function. As expected of in-house counsel, his role in pre-
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acquisition due diligence was to assess the legal risks [see Ex. 48 at 48.9; Tr. Vol. I at 467:16-18,
1133:21-1134:10; Tr. Vol. II at 2014:19-2015:5] and then try to address those legal risks by
negotiating directly with T3/Thurston. [See Tr. Vol. I at 371:8-21, 416:7-10.] The written
agreements that resulted from those negotiations, each executed by T3 and Thurston, expressly
state they were a “resolution” of account protection issues. [See Ex. 1009, 1063.]
Accepting the District Court’s reasoning would effectively negate the ability of in-house
lawyers to counsel their clients on a day-to-day basis, creating a loophole that undermines the
established law and public policy favoring full and frank internal discussions between lawyers
and clients. The District Court abused its discretion. This Court should: (i) reverse the District
Court’s order of March 24, 2016; (ii) require T3/Thurston and their counsel to return or destroy
all privileged information; and (iii) vacate both the arbitration award and trial judgment.
B.

The Arbitration Award Should be Vacated Because the Privileged
Documents Were Used and Relied on by the Arbitration Panel.

As noted previously, the erroneous admission of attorney-client privileged material
inherently prejudices the right to a fair proceeding. See Iwakiri, 106 Idaho at 621; see also
Frontier Refining, 136 F.3d at 706. That consequence is logically the same regardless of whether
the adjudication occurs by way of a trial or arbitration. Nevertheless, to the extent the District
Court’s error is subject to being treated differently in this appeal because it resulted in an
Arbitration Award, the strong public policy behind attorney-client privilege still requires vacatur.
Federal courts reviewing arbitration awards have long recognized and applied a rule that
they will not uphold an award if it would require a court to sanction a violation of public policy.
See Aramark Facility Servs. v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 530 F.3d 817, 823 (9th Cir. 2008)
(noting it is a “now-settled rule that a court need not, in fact cannot, enforce an award which
violates public policy”) (citation omitted). For an arbitration award to violate public policy, there
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must be: (1) “an explicit, well defined and dominant policy”; and (2) “the policy should be one
that specifically militates against the relief ordered by the arbitrator.” Id. The erroneous
disclosure of the Privileged Documents in this case qualifies under both prongs.
First, it is indisputable that the attorney-client privilege is a “well defined and dominant
policy” under federal law, Texas law, and long-standing Idaho law.11 Second, that dominant
policy is upheld in this circumstance only by vacating the Arbitration Award because the
privileged information was explicitly relied upon by the Panel for its decision-making. In fact,
several Privileged Documents are directly quoted throughout the award:


Exhibit 157 is quoted at Paragraphs 32, 111, and 129 of the Interim
Award [R. 8122, 8137-38, 8141-42];



Exhibit 327 is quoted at Paragraphs 32 and 111 of the Interim Award [R.
8122, 8137-38];



Exhibit 330 is quoted at Paragraph 129 of the Interim Award [R. 814142]; and



Exhibit 359 is quoted at Paragraph 128 of the Interim Award. [R. 8141.]

Accordingly, the risk identified by the Tenth Circuit in Frontier Refining—that a
factfinder “would accord significant or undue weight to the testimony and admissions of a
party’s own lawyers,” 136 F.3d at 706—is readily apparent from the Arbitration Award itself.

11

See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (“The attorney–client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for
confidential communications known to the common law.”) (citation omitted); Paxton v. City of
Dallas, 509 S.W.3d 247, 259 (Tex. 2017) (“The attorney-client privilege holds a special place
among privileges: it is the oldest and most venerated of the common law privileges of
confidential communications. As the most sacred of all legally recognized privileges, its
preservation is essential to the just and orderly operation of our legal system. … The attorneyclient privilege exists—and has been a cornerstone of our legal system for nearly 500 years—
because the interests protected and secured by the promise of confidentiality are not merely
significant; they are quintessentially imperative.”) (citations and editing omitted); Ex parte
Niday, 15 Idaho 559, 566, 98 P. 845 (1908) (recognizing privilege early in 1900s).
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Like this Court did in Iwakiri, 106 Idaho at 621, it should reverse the result of the District
Court’s error, which, in this instance, means vacating the entire Arbitration Award.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING SBS’S MOTION TO VACATE THE AWARD
BASED ON THE ARBITRATION PANEL EXCEEDING ITS POWER.
As noted, a substantial prejudicial consequence of the District Court’s error in striking the

Dallas forum and ordering the parties’ to arbitrate in Idaho was the tribunal formed by the
AAA’s Denver office had no prior experience with Texas law. [See R. 13822-29.] Predictably,
that Panel proceeded to ignore and misinterpret several aspects of Texas law (as well as
misconstrue factual issues). Under the FAA, ordinary factual and legal errors usually cannot be
corrected because, in agreeing to arbitrate, a party trades full appellate review for speed and
informality. See Moore v. Omnicare, Inc., 141 Idaho 809, 815, 118 P.3d 141, 147 (2005). Of
course, as detailed in connection with Issue 1, SBS did not receive the Dallas-administered
arbitration for which it bargained. The Arbitration Award should be vacated for that reason
alone. Nonetheless, the Panel’s award of $4.3 million so greatly contradicts express contractual
limitations on damages, manifestly disregards the parties’ choice of Texas law, and defies
rationality (as well as violates public policy) that the award itself is contrary to the agreement to
arbitrate. When arbitrators exceed their power in such a way, their decisions are no longer
entitled to any deference. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 671
(2010) (arbitrator’s “own brand of industrial justice” unenforceable); see also PoolRe Ins. Corp.
v. Org. Strategies, Inc., 783 F.3d 256, 262 (5th Cir. 2015) (“However, where the arbitrator
exceeds the express limitations of his contractual mandate, judicial deference is at an end.”).
To be clear, arbitration arises solely from—and an arbitrator’s power is consequently
constrained by—the agreement of the parties. Thus, the FAA provides for vacating an award
“where the arbitrators exceeded their powers,” 9 U.S.C § 10(a)(4), which can occur in several
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ways, including: not applying the parties’ choice of law; violating other terms of their contract;
or issuing an award contrary to public policy. [See Standards of Review, supra, pp. 9-10.] In
addition, federal courts have interpreted FAA § 10(a)(4) such that an award must be vacated
when an arbitrator “manifestly disregards” the law or the award is “completely irrational.” This
Court fully recognizes and applies those standards to an arbitration award governed by the FAA.
See Hecla Mining Co. v. Bunker Hill Co., 101 Idaho 557, 564-66, 617 P.2d 861, 868-70 (1980);
see also Carroll v. MBNA Am. Bank, 148 Idaho 261, 265 n.2, 220 P.3d 1080, 1084 n.2 (2009);
Barbee v. WMA Sec., Inc., 143 Idaho 391, 396 n.4, 146 P.3d 657, 662 n.4 (2006).
SBS thus seeks to vacate T3’s Arbitration Award on the grounds that the Panel exceeded
its power and violated the FAA by: (i) ignoring the parties’ choice of Texas law to declare the
distributorship “constructively terminated” based on Connecticut/New Jersey statutes; (ii)
irrationally ruling T3 could recover future losses as if the contract continued while also
terminating the contract and excusing T3 from its post-termination obligations in the contract;
(iii) awarding gross profits in manifest disregard of Texas law requiring proof of “net” loss; (iv)
awarding 8-12 years of future damages despite an undisputed month-to-month term of the
contract; and (v) re-writing the contract to award attorneys’ fees and expenses on the basis of
AAA procedural rules, and doubling the fees incurred by T3 to award an amount far beyond the
express contractual limit of “actual damages for commercial loss.”
If this Court does not grant relief on the basis of Issues 1 or 2, SBS requests the Court
vacate the Arbitration Award under the standards of federal arbitration law.
A.

The Panel Exceeded its Power by Declaring a “Constructive Termination”
Based on Connecticut/New Jersey Law.

Paragraph 18 of the Distributor Agreement provides that “the distributorship and the
relationship between [T3] and Safeguard will be governed and construed under and in
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accordance with the laws of Texas ….” [R. 7717.] Yet, the Panel paid no heed to that mandate by
awarding $566,143.61 to T3 for a supposed “constructive termination” of its distributorship on
the basis of non-Texas law. [R. 8134-35 at ¶¶ 97-101.] In doing so, the Panel exceeded its power.
To begin with, no party sought a constructive termination [see Tr. Vol. III at 684:2-15
(T3’s counsel acknowledging to District Court that the Panel came up with the termination
theory on its own)].12 Then, to support its manufactured theory, the Panel expressly relied on
four cases outside of Texas law. [R. 8134-35 (¶ 98).] Two cases cited by the Panel declared a
constructive termination based on other states’ statutes—Connecticut and New Jersey13—and the
other two did not involve (or mention) termination at all.14 Under the Ninth Circuit’s standard in
Coutee v. Barington Capital, an arbitrator’s failure to adhere to the parties’ choice of law
violates FAA § 10(a)(4) if it is not a “harmless error,” meaning the arbitrator could not have

12

T3 did seek (not in its arbitration demand, but only in briefing later) to “revoke acceptance of
the franchise and return it to Safeguard for its market value” based on Texas’s version of the
Uniform Commercial Code. [See R. 7838, 7998 (¶ 123).] Revoking acceptance, however, is
fundamentally different from termination. Revocation puts the parties back in the position they
would have been had no contract formed, while termination concedes a valid contract existed.
Accordingly, if the Panel had granted T3’s request for revocation, there would no distributorship
to value at $566,143.61. Thus it is doubly baffling that the Panel denied T3’s “revocation” theory
[see R. 8134-35 (¶¶ 97-98)] but nevertheless proceeded to craft a constructive termination theory
on its own outside of Texas law to award T3 the entire value of its distributorship.
13

In Petereit v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 63 F.3d 1169 (2d Cir. 1995), distributors of baked-bread
products claimed they should be treated as franchisors under the Connecticut Franchise Act and
argued they were “constructively terminated” when the manufacturer realigned their geographic
territories. The Second Circuit affirmed a ruling that, under the Connecticut statute, the
distributors were “constructively terminated.” In Maintainco, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Caterpillar
Forklift Am., Inc., 408 N.J. Super. 461, 474–75, 975 A.2d 510, 518 (App. Div. 2009), a New
Jersey court held it was a “constructive termination” under the New Jersey Franchise Act for a
franchisor to “directly or indirectly … cancel or fail to renew a franchise without good cause.”
14

The Panel’s reliance on Gossard v. Adia Servs., Inc., 723 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1998) and Carvel
Corp. v. Baker, 79 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D. Conn. 1997), is puzzling. There is no termination in either.
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made the same award under the proper law. 336 F.3d 1128, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, the
Panel could not have declared a constructive termination under Texas law. Texas does not have a
franchise statute and no court in Texas has approved a theory for “constructive termination” of a
franchisee. Therefore, the Panel’s violation was not harmless error.
At the trial court level, however, T3 argued—and the District Court accepted—a
contention that, since no Texas court had affirmatively “rejected”15 a constructive termination
theory, the Panel was merely “looking to persuasive case law to determine how a Texas court
may rule” if presented with the issue. [R. 12746.] That was error because no court (and certainly
no arbitrator) has authority to create new statutory rights as the Panel did here and there is no
authority interpreting the FAA in a way that allows an arbitrator to predict or make new law of
any kind. Given that an arbitrator’s power arises solely from the parties’ agreement, they must
apply the law chosen by the parties as it exists as opposed to speculating how a court or
legislature could change, extend, or add to that law in the future because, otherwise, the parties’
choice of law is eviscerated. Arbitrators would be free to disregard the chosen law at will and
award whatever they want under the guise of “predicting” how that law might change in the
future. This Court should not sanction such an unprecedented and limitless expansion of
arbitrator power under the FAA.
15

The District Court found it particularly relevant that SBS had “not pointed to any Texas
authority contradicting or rejecting the [constructive termination] theory.” [R. 12746.] SBS
maintains it is not proper to require a party to prove a negative—i.e., that something which does
not exist in Texas law has been rejected by a court—but, when it became clear at the hearing this
was an issue for the District Court, SBS requested, and was not granted, the opportunity for
supplemental briefing. [See Tr. Vol. III at 641:10-21.] More research has since been done and, in
this Court’s de novo review, SBS notes that Texas previously had a statute applicable to certain
“dealer agreements” similar to the New Jersey and Connecticut statutes, but it was repealed in
2011. See TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE Ch. 55 (West 2011) [Repealed by Acts 2011, 82nd Leg.,
Ch. 1039 (H.B. 3079) § 3, eff. Sept. 1, 2011]. As such, in that regard, Texas has affirmatively
rejected any constructive termination theory that could arise from a franchise statute.
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Further, the suggestion that the Panel in this matter was attempting to predict how a
Texas court may rule if asked to declare a constructive termination is a fiction created by T3’s
attorneys after-the-fact because: (i) no request for termination was ever presented to the Panel
and (ii) there is no suggestion in the Interim Award that the Panel was predicting Texas law.
Quite the contrary, the Panel skipped past Texas law to grant T3 new statutory rights on the basis
of Connecticut/New Jersey franchise acts. That is the epitome of an arbitrator improperly doling
out his or her “own brand of industrial justice.” Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 559 U.S. at 671.
Therefore, the Arbitration Award must be vacated in full under FAA § 10(a)(4) or, in the
alternative, vacated at least in regard to the constructive termination ruling (representing
$566,143.61 in damages) and Fee Order ($2,449,208.14) since, under Texas law, attorneys’ fees
are predicated on each specific “cause of action” upon which a party prevails. See, e.g., Green
Int’l, Inc. v. Solis, 951 S.W.2d 384, 389 (Tex. 1997) (“A failure to segregate attorney’s fees in a
case containing multiple causes of action, only some of which entitle the recovery of attorney’s
fees, can result in the recovery of zero attorney’s fees.”).
B.

The Panel Irrationally Contradicted Law and Logic by Terminating the
Contract and, at the Same Time, Awarding Future Contract Benefits.

Shortly after the Panel issued its Interim Award declaring a constructive termination,
SBS requested clarification as to T3’s post-termination obligations in the contract. [R. 8146-48.]
In response, T3 declared it was electing a full discharge due to breach. [Id.] The Panel accepted
that election and thus issued the Supplement to Interim Award that defied all reason by both
discharging T3 from all its post-termination obligations under the contract (including a noncompete and requirement to return SBS’s confidential information) while still awarding 8-12
years of future damages as if the contract continued in force.
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It is a basic principle of law that, when a contract is materially breached, the nonbreaching party must elect to: (i) treat the breach as discharging all future performance (which
applies to both parties) or (ii) continue performance and demand the same from the other party.
If the non-breaching party demands any future performance from the other party, it remains
bound to all its own obligations under the contract. See Henry v. Masson, 333 S.W.3d 825, 840
(Tex. App. 2010). As such, a plaintiff cannot both be discharged from its own obligations and
receive future performance from the other party, whether termed a present value of future
damages or otherwise. See id. at 840-41. If a party elects discharge from its future obligations, as
T3 did here, then the contract immediately ends and both parties have no further obligations.
[See R. 19652.] T3’s expert on damages, Robert Taylor, discussed that elementary point when he
testified before the Panel that, if the distributorship were to end at any time, “then there would be
no number for the future.” [R. 7900 at 1666:16-21 (emphasis added).] The Arbitration Award
violates that clear principle of law and logic by granting T3 future benefits for 8-12 years
[R. 8133-34 (¶¶ 92-94)] while also declaring the Distributor Agreement “is hereby terminated”
and T3 is “excuse[d] of any performance … of the post term covenant against competition,” and
further allowing T3 to illegally keep SBS’s confidential information. [See R. 8151-52 (¶¶ 136138); R. 7715 (¶ 13) (T3 agreeing customer lists are “confidential information belonging to
Safeguard”).] Such inconsistency defies reason. There is no conceivable way T3 can have both.16
As a result, the Arbitration Award must be vacated as “completely irrational.” An award
is completely irrational when it “fails to draw its essence from the agreement of the parties,”

16

Under Paragraph 12(A) of the Distributor Agreement, T3 could receive 50% of its historical
commissions for two years after a termination. [R. 7713.] However, the Panel’s future damages
could not be supported on the basis of Paragraph 12(A) because that provision is subject to posttermination conditions that still conflict with T3’s election of discharge. [Id.]
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Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1288 (9th Cir. 2009), which means “an
award may not stand if it does not meet the test of fundamental rationality.” Swift Indus., Inc. v.
Botany Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d 1125, 1131 (3d Cir. 1972) (ruling $6 million cash bond to cover
max liability of $1.5 million not yet incurred was irrational).
A controlling example of how the Panel’s award is “completely irrational” comes from
the facts of the Ninth Circuit’s Comedy Club opinion. In that case, the arbitrator’s decision to
revoke a defendant’s (CCI’s) license to open new clubs under the “Improv” brand, while
simultaneously enforcing a non-compete preventing CCI from opening other non-Improv clubs,
was rational because the trademark agreement at issue had not been terminated. See Comedy
Club, 553 F.3d at 1289, 1290 n. 14. Rather, the plaintiff (Improv West) elected to continue the
contract and enforce performance as to the clubs CCI owned and would continue to operate for
the remaining term of the agreement (to 2019). Id. The Ninth Circuit specifically stressed,
however, that the arbitrator’s decision would have been irrational if the opposite occurred: i.e., if
the plaintiff had elected to end the contract. See id. at 1288 (“Both parties agree that if the
Trademark Agreement is no longer in effect then the … covenant not to compete similarly would
no longer be in effect, and the arbitrator’s award would be considered irrational.”). The inverse
scenario condemned as irrational by Comedy Club is precisely what the Panel did here. The
Arbitration Award fully terminates the contract at T3’s own election (awarding $566,143.61 as
the lost market value of its entire distributorship), yet inconsistently treats the contract as
continuing to also award $373,473.76 in future commissions for 8-12 years. Under Comedy
Club, that inherent contradiction is “completely irrational” and requires the award to be vacated.
In addition, awarding post-termination future damages without requiring T3 to comply
with its own obligations violates the express contract limitation that only “actual damages for
commercial loss” could be awarded (thereby crossing into prohibited punitive/exemplary
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damages). [See R. 7717 (¶ 17(C)), 7719 (¶ 21(B)).] The award should be vacated for that reason
as well. See, e.g., Coast Trading Co., Inc. v. Pac. Molasses Co., 681 F.2d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir.
1982) (vacating award as “contrary to remedies provided in the contract”).
Moreover, an award of the entire alleged lost market value of the distributorship, plus
future damages, is a double recovery that is against public policy. Again, to vacate on such
grounds, there must be an “explicit, well defined and dominant policy” and it must be “one that
specifically militates against the relief ordered by the arbitrator.” Aramark Facility Servs. v. Serv.
Emps. Int’l Union, 530 F.3d 817, 823 (9th Cir. 2008). Under well-established Texas law, double
recoveries are against public policy because they violate the “one satisfaction” rule. Tony Gullo
Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 303 (Tex. 2006) (“There can be but one recovery for
one injury, and the fact that there may be more than one theory of liability does not modify this
rule.”); Temple v. FDIC, 988 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir. 1993) (“The one satisfaction rule is based on
the notion that allowing a double recovery is ordinarily against public policy.”); see Am. Foreign
Ins. Co. v. Reichert, 140 Idaho 394, 399, 94 P.3d 699, 704 (Idaho 2004) (same).
As a result, the Arbitration Award must be vacated either: (i) as “completely irrational”;
(ii) for violating an express contract prohibition; or (iii) on grounds of public policy.
In response to SBS’s motion to vacate at the District Court level, T3 asserted the Panel’s
award was not irrational when characterizing the $373,473.76 amount not as “future benefits
under the T3 Distributor Agreement,” but instead as part of a “lost asset value going forward.”
[R. 8454.] The District Court adopted that view. [R. 12747 (using same “lost asset going
forward” phrase).] However, that was plain error because, to the extent the Panel’s award is valid
at all, T3 is bound by the arbitrators’ findings on disputed facts no less than is SBS and the Panel
repeatedly declared it was awarding $373,473.76 for future lost commissions [see R. 8133-34 (¶¶
92-94)], while $566,143.61 was awarded as the lost market value of T3’s entire business. [See R.
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8135 (¶ 100).] Under the FAA, the District Court was required to defer to the Panel’s findings on
those points. See Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1102 (9th
Cir. 2003). If the District Court had followed that law instead of deferring to T3’s recharacterization of the futures damages awarded by the Panel, it would have been left with no
choice but to conclude the Arbitration Award contains a fundamental inconsistency that cannot
be upheld. This Court, exercising its de novo review, should vacate the Arbitration Award in full
or, alternatively, at least strike the future damages element ($373,473.76).
C.

The Panel Manifestly Disregarded Texas Law and the Contract to Award
Damages Based on Gross Profits Rather Than Net Profit.

Additionally, the Panel’s award of “lost commissions” (past and future) was a manifest
disregard of Texas law because the amounts were based on gross profits and revenue instead of a
net commission payable to T3 under the terms of its contract. To be clear, distributors like T3 act
solely as sales agents [see R. 7704 (¶ 5(A)) (contract stating “[t]he relationship between
Safeguard and you shall be that of principal and independent sales agent …”)] who solicit orders
to be placed with SBS in return for a commission of around 30-35% on completed sales. [See
R. 7899 at 1662:16-1663:6.]17 That is the most a distributor could receive under its contract in
regard to any account protection claim. Further, T3 and SBS expressly bargained that, upon a
“termination” by either party, the most T3 could receive in the future was, subject to certain
post-termination obligations,18 a reduced percentage of commissions as to repeat sales, and only
for two years, as provided in Paragraph 12(A) of the contract:

17

Once a customer places an order with a distributor, SBS handles all other aspects of a sale—
e.g., invoicing, shipping, collecting payment, guarantees, returns—and a commission is remitted
to the distributor. [See generally R. 8111 (¶ 1).]
18

Paragraph 12(A) makes post-termination payments subject to a non-compete and return of
SBS’s confidential information, which is inconsistent with T3’s discharge. [See, supra, note 16].
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If Safeguard terminates this Agreement for any of the reasons set forth in
Paragraph 10 … or if you terminate this Agreement, Safeguard will … pay you
(or your beneficiaries) for two (2) years after the effective date of termination,
fifty percent (50%) of the commissions generated on all repeat sales of Safeguard
Systems that are made during such period to customers from whom you were
entitled to receive commissions while this Agreement was still in effect …
[R. 7714 (¶ 12(A)).] The Panel, however, awarded “gross profits” to T3 on past sales by
DocuSource/IBF and “one times annual revenue” for future sales (representing 8-12 years of
commissions into the future). That was a manifest disregard of the controlling Texas law.
Under Ninth Circuit precedent, manifest disregard occurs when the record shows an
arbitrator “recognized the applicable law and then ignored it.” Comedy Club, 553 F.3d at 1290.
The law ignored must be “well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable.” Carter v. Health Net of
Cal., Inc., 374 F.3d 830, 838 (9th Cir. 2004). At the lower court level, the District Court added a
further requirement that an arbitrator must first explicitly “state” in writing the law being ignored
before it rises to the level of manifest disregard. [See R. 12743-44.] That was an error of law as
to the legal standard because it allows arbitrators to disregard applicable law by simply not
writing it out in their award. Rather, as stated in Comedy Club, the standard turns on whether an
arbitrator “recognized” the law. 553 F.3d at 1290. The Second Circuit has ruled that to mean the
applicable law can be: (i) “imputed” by what the parties identified to the arbitrators, or (ii)
“inferred” if the controlling law is “so obvious that it would be instantly perceived as such by the
average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator.” Duferco Int’l Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness
Shipping A/S, 333 F.3d 383, 390 (2d Cir. 2003). That is the legal standard the District Court
should have applied and, when done here, it is clear the “well defined … explicit” Texas law
requiring proof of net profit lost was applicable and manifestly disregarded by the Panel.
First, Texas law explicitly provides the “correct measure of damages for loss of profits is
net profits” and that damages may not be based on “gross revenue or gross profits.” Exel Transp.
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Servs., Inc. v. Aim High Logistics Servs., LLC, 323 S.W.3d 224, 232 (Tex. App. 2010). Net
profits are “what remains in the conduct of business after deducting from its total receipts all of
the expenses incurred in carrying on the business.” Id. As such, Texas courts reverse awards
where there is no “showing that expenses were deducted in arriving at net profits lost.” See, e.g.,
Texaco, Inc. v. Phan, 137 S.W.3d 763, 772 (Tex. App. 2004). Second, the record reflects the
controlling Texas law was “clearly applicable.” Both T3 and its expert, Robert Taylor,
acknowledged that commissions are not calculated until after fees are deducted. [See R. 7880 at
1273:7-19, R. 7898 at 1627:17-1628:16, 7900 at 1668:2-13; see also R. 7737, 19641.] Yet,
Taylor did not do that for his damage calculations. [R. 7900 at 1667:4-8 (“Q. And all that you
did, again, with respect to this category, was look at the gross profit of IBF, correct? A. Yes, sir.
That was the ultimate number.”). He simply took the sales of DocuSource/IBF—i.e., the retail
price paid by customers—and subtracted an accounting concept called the “base price” to derive
gross profits. [See, e.g., R. 7920-21 (“Grand Total-Sales”), 7922-23 (“Grand Total-Base Price”),
7924-25 (“Grand Total-GP”); see also R. 19642.] Further, in regard to future commissions,
Taylor used a “one times annual revenue” metric that covered at least 8-12 years. [R. 7896 at
1606:17-1608:9, 7899-7900 at 1665:22-1666:8.] Third, the Panel was explicitly informed that
Texas law does not allow damages to be based on gross profits or revenue. SBS’s post-hearing
brief identified the precise Texas cases recited above [see R. 8102-03 (¶ 100)] and detailed the
insufficiency of Taylor’s calculations. [R. 8070 (¶ 64).] T3 offered no controverting law and, in
fact, boldly declared it sought gross profits. [See R. 7994 (¶ 103).]
Despite being made aware of the controlling Texas law, the Panel adopted Taylor’s
calculations to award gross profits on sales in the amount of $321,657.7719 [R. 8129 (¶ 70), 8133
19

[See R. 7946 (Taylor’s “gross profits” of $315,756.18 for IBF and $5,901.59 for DocuSource
add up to the Panel’s $321,657.77).]
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(¶ 91)] and future damages of $373,473.76 based on Taylor’s revenue metric (although, unlike
Thurston’s trial, that was at least reduced to account for the undisputed fact DocuSource no
longer sold in Idaho). [R. 8134 (¶¶ 93-94); see also R. 8129 (¶ 71).] Accordingly, this Court
should vacate the award in full or, alternatively, the total past and future damages ($695,131.53).
D.

The Panel Manifestly Disregarded the Undisputed Month-to-Month Nature
of the Contract to Award Future Losses for 8-12 Years.

Further, in regard to future lost commissions specifically, the Panel ignored that the
distributorship unambiguously existed only on a “month-to-month” terminable basis [R. 7711
(¶ 10(F)); see also R. 19645], which was admitted by T3 in its testimony. [See R. 7877-78 at
1261:18-1262:2.] As such, the terminable nature was an undisputed fact; which limits arbitrator
power. See Coutee v. Barington Capital Grp., L.P., 336 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating
courts cannot “confirm an arbitration award that is legally irreconcilable with the undisputed
facts” and that, “because facts and law are often intertwined, an arbitrator’s failure to recognize
undisputed, legally dispositive facts may properly be deemed a manifest disregard for the law”).
Here, Taylor testified his calculation for $373,473.76 in future damages—based on the
“one times annual revenue” metric—would compensate T3 for “8 to 12 years” into the future, or
even into “perpetuity.” [R. 7899-7900 at 1665:22-1666:8.] Yet, as a matter of law, the term of a
contract inherently limits the amount and availability of future profits a party could expect to
receive as damages. See Mood v. Kronos Prods., Inc., 245 S.W.3d 8, 13 (Tex. App. 2007)
(rejecting award of lost profits for ten years into the future when the contract could be terminated
on sixty days’ notice); see also Atlas Copco Tools, Inc. v. Air Power Tool & Hoist, Inc., 131
S.W.3d 203, 208 (Tex. App. 2004) (rejecting lost profits when expert did not consider year-toyear renewable term of contract). Under the undisputed facts, the most T3 could have been
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awarded for future losses was limited to the monthly term of the contract (i.e., 30 days of future
losses), which is far exceeded by an award extending for 8-12 years into the future.
SBS specifically identified the Mood and Atlas Copco cases to the Panel and discussed
the application of Atlas Copco at length in its post-hearing briefing. [R. 8099-8101 (¶¶ 93-95),
8104 (¶ 102).] T3, for its part, did not address the issue at all. [See generally R. 7949-8022.] Yet
the Panel awarded the full $373,473.76 anyway. This Court should independently vacate the 812 years of future losses awarded based on the undisputed month-to-month contract term.
E.

The Panel Disregarded Texas Law and Express Contract Limitations to
Award a Doubled Amount of Attorneys’ Fees and Litigation Expenses.

The portion of the Arbitration Award granting T3 a recovery of $2,449,208.14 in
attorneys’ fees and $437,126.28 in “expenses”—which together are more than twice the damages
(see R. 19657)—should also be vacated. To award so much the Panel had to re-write the
contract, which exceeds an arbitrator’s power under FAA § 10(a)(4). See, e.g., PMA Capital Ins.
Co. v. Platinum Underwriters Bermuda, Ltd., 659 F. Supp. 2d 631, 636 (E.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d,
400 F. App’x 654 (3d Cir. 2010); Inter-City Gas Corp. v. Boise Cascade Corp., 845 F.2d 184,
187 (8th Cir. 1988) (“The arbitrator’s authority, however, is not unlimited. Although the
arbitrator may interpret ambiguous language, the arbitrator may not disregard or modify
unambiguous contract provisions.”). Furthermore, the Panel’s multiplication of attorneys’ fees
incurred (by 2.0x) violates the express contractual limit of “actual damages for commercial loss.”
1.

The Panel Could Not Rely on AAA Rule 47.

In its Fee Order, the Panel claimed it had power to award attorneys’ fees and costs
beyond Texas law because Paragraph 21(B) of the Distributor Agreement incorporates the
AAA’s Commercial Arbitration Rules (the “Rules”). [See R. 8257-59 (relying on AAA
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Rule 47).20] However, the contract does not state the AAA Rules would supply a substantive
basis to govern any claim or relief. Rather, Paragraph 21(B) merely states the arbitration “shall
be conducted” under the AAA’s Rules. [R. 7718-19 (emphasis added).] Fees and costs are
substantive matters that are governed by the parties’ choice of Texas law. See Rapp Collins
Worldwide, Inc. v. Mohr, 982 S.W.2d 478, 487 (Tex. App. 1998) (“We conclude the issue of
attorneys’ fees is a substantive part of a lawsuit and therefore should be governed by the law of
the state governing the substantive issues.”); see also Fairmont Supply Co. v. Hooks Indus., Inc.,
177 S.W.3d 529, 535–36 (Tex. App. 2005) (same). Further, as this Court has ruled before, the
phrase “shall be conducted” reflects that the AAA Rules merely provided a procedural
framework for arbitration and not a substantive basis for any relief. See Moore v. Omnicare, Inc.,
141 Idaho 809, 817-18, 118 P.3d 141, 149-50 (2005) (ruling the AAA Rules are procedural such
that arbitrators could not use former version of Rule 47 (i.e., rule 43) to award fees).
Contrary to the Panel’s suggestion as well, the parties did not agree by their submissions
to give the Panel “jurisdiction” to use AAA Rule 47 as a substantive basis to award fees and
costs. [See R. 8258 at 2:12-18 (Panel asserting as much).] Both T3’s demand for arbitration and
SBS’s response requested fees and costs generically [see R. 7787, 7810] and then T3’s posthearing briefing sought fees solely on the basis of Texas law. [R. 8177-78.] The only AAA rule
mentioned by T3 was “Rule 43,” and then only to note it allows arbitrators to grant any relief
proper “within the scope of the agreement of the parties.” [R. 8177.] T3 accordingly went on to
recite that the Distributor Agreement required the application of Texas law. [See generally R.

20

AAA Rule 47 itself states arbitrators can only award relief “within the scope of the agreement
of the parties” [see R. 8272], which points right back to the contract and Texas law.
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8177-8202.] As a result, the question of whether attorneys’ fees were to be governed by AAA
Rule 47 or Texas law was never an issue for the Panel to decide.
The Panel’s use of AAA Rule 47 was not harmless error either. At a minimum, AAA
Rule 47 was used to: (i) ignore the requirement in Texas law that a party formally “present” their
claims before fees may be awarded [R. 8258 at 2:21-23];21 (ii) grant attorneys’ fees for
unsegregated legal work occurring outside the Arbitration (and in the District Court Action) [R.
8259-60 at 3:11-4:2];22 and (iii) award litigation “costs” that are specifically disallowed by Texas
law; such as the full amount of expert witness fees.23 [R. 8258 at 2:24-28.] Accordingly, the Fee
Order should be vacated in full.

21

Absent evidence of timely presentment, no attorneys’ fees can be awarded. See Kahn v. Seely,
980 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex. App. 1998). The Panel shrugged off that deficiency on the basis that
“[t]here is no AAA Commercial Rule that requires T3 to ‘present’ its demand for attorneys’ fees
to SBS.” [See R. 8258 at 2:21-23.]
22

Texas allows unsegregated fees only for intertwined claims, not proceedings. See Tony Gullo
Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 311 (Tex. 2006) (“[F]ee claimants have always been
required to segregate fees between claims for which they are recoverable and claims for which
they are not”) (emphasis added); see also Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945
S.W.2d 812, 819 (Tex. 1997) (stating “jury must decide the question of attorney’s fees
specifically in light of the work performed in the very case for which the fee is sought.”)
(emphasis added). The Panel ignored that by awarding fees incurred in the District Court Action.
23

The Panel awarded T3 litigation expenses—e.g., expert witness fees ($220,000), postage
($8,000), document vendor fees ($27,000), and $34,000 in photocopying/binders—as “costs” [R.
8199-820] when costs in Texas are strictly limited to “those paid to courts or their officers.” In re
Nalle Plastics Family Ltd. P’ship, 406 S.W.3d 168, 175 (Tex. 2013); see also Bundren v. Holly
Oaks Townhomes Ass’n, 347 S.W.3d 421, 440 (Tex. App. 2011) (expert witness fees not
recoverable); Shenandoah Assocs. v. J & K Properties, Inc., 741 S.W.2d 470, 487 (Tex. App.
1987) (barring all “expenses incurred in preparation of trial”). Indeed, Nalle explicitly rejected
the notion that “litigation costs” are recoverable. 406 S.W.3d at 175-76. Yet, the Panel granted
T3 all the expenses it sought to recover on the basis that “costs” in Texas were only a “subset of
the larger category of expenses” recoverable under AAA Rule 47. [R. 8258 at 2:24-28.]
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2.

The Doubled Attorneys’ Fees Violate an Express Contract Limit of
“Actual Damages for Commercial Loss.”

Furthermore, in its Fee Order, the Panel determined the “actual attorneys’ fees” incurred
by T3 were $1,222,604.07 and then applied a “2.0 multiplier” to double that to $2,449,208.14.
[R. 8263 at 7:4-10; see also R. 19657, 19664.] Texas law allows a lodestar amount (hours
worked multiplied by a “reasonable” rate) to be increased by a multiplier in some instances, but
there is no authority for a windfall recovery of millions in fees beyond any actual loss. [See R.
8253 (citing cases).] The Distributor Agreement unambiguously states that all amounts
recoverable by either party “… SHALL BE LIMITED TO ACTUAL DAMAGES FOR
COMMERCIAL LOSS” and specifically bars punitive/exemplary awards. [R. 7717 (¶ 17(C));
see also 7719 (¶ 21(B)).] The Panel plainly violated that express limitation on its power, which is
a violation of the FAA. See, e.g., Coast Trading Co., Inc. v. Pac. Molasses Co., 681 F.2d 1195,
1198 (9th Cir. 1982) (vacating award as “contrary to remedies provided in the contract”). The
most the Panel legitimately had power to award in attorneys’ fees were those it determined T3
had actually incurred. This Court, in its de novo review, should vacate the Fee Order.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments and the record, SBS requests this Court to:
1.

Reverse the District Court’s ruling that it had jurisdiction to consider T3’s

objection to forum [R. 984] and vacate the resulting Arbitration Award or, alternatively (if
jurisdiction existed), reverse the District Court’s ruling that Texas law requires striking the
Dallas forum [R. 989-90] and vacate the resulting Arbitration Award for violating FAA § 5;
2.

Reverse the District Court’s overruling of SBS’s attorney-client privilege [R.

2227] and order: (a) T3 and its counsel to return and/or destroy all privileged information
disclosed to them; and (b) that the Arbitration Award is vacated in full;
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3.

Vacate the Arbitration Award under FAA § 10(a)(4) and corresponding federal

case law, or, alternatively, vacate the award in substantial parts in accordance with the arguments
and record presented in connection with Issue 3 herein; and
4.

Award SBS its costs on appeal.
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